If China goes ahead with its proposed export of nuclear plants to Pakistan, it would be violating both its domestic laws and international obligations.
Mark Hibbs, currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and formerly a well-known and respected correspondent who covered nuclear issues for Nucleonics Week and Nuclear Fuel, reports that China is soon expected to announce the export of two new reactors to Pakistan in addition to the two that it is already working on in Pakistan.
If true, this development may deal both the NSG and any positive movement towards global disarmament a crippling blow. First of all, contrary to Hibbs’s statement that China is not legally bound to follow NSG Guidelines, China has thrice affirmed its commitment in official communiqué to the IAEA that it would abide by NSG Guidelines. The first was in January 2004, when, pending its application for NSG membership, the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China sent a Note Verbale to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stating that “China will, once admitted into NSG, act in accordance with the NSG Guidelines (as contained in INFCIRC/254/Part and Part 2, including Annexes, as amended)” (INFCIRC/627).
Subsequently, following its admission into the NSG in 2004, China sent another Note Verbale, on December 1, 2005, along with other NSG members, stating that “the Permanent Mission of China presents its compliments to the Director general of the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) and has the honour to refer to its previous communication concerning the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of China to act in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers currently published as document INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1, including its Annexes.” (INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part I)
Finally, on 22 March, 2007, the Permanent Mission of Brazil sent a Note Verbale on behalf of NSG members, including China, confirming the NSG members’ decision to act in accordance with the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers published as amended. (INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part1). Hence, formally, China had thrice affirmed its intention to act according to NSG Guidelines, including full-scope safeguards in respect of exports to Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).
In addition, China’s own domestic law, “The People’s Republic of China Nuclear Export Control Regulations” after its November 2006 revision, required that except in case of NWS with voluntary safeguards, “the recipient government and the International Atomic Energy Agency have an effective comprehensive safeguards agreement” (Art V(c)).
So, if China goes ahead with its proposed exports of nuclear power plants to Pakistan in violation of NSG Guidelines without an explicit amendment to NSG Guidelines similar to the one that was given in respect of India, it would be violating both its domestic laws and international obligations.
This is not to suggest that China will not be doing so. There is ample evidence to suggest that China has consistently flouted its nuclear export control obligations over a long period of time. It is well-known that Pakistan’s domestic production of natural uranium is not sufficient to fuel its three reactors (KANUPP, Khushab I and Khushab II) and its enrichment plants. The fuelling requirements for all these facilities far exceed the IAEA/OECD estimate of Pakistan’s domestic uranium production, at around 40 tonnes annually.
There have been unconfirmed reports that China has been supplying the needed natural uranium — reported to be around 300 tonnes — to Pakistan without any safeguards — which incidentally goes to feed Pakistan’s strategic programme, and is in violation of its own safeguards agreement with IAEA, which requires China to report its nuclear exports to IAEA. Nevertheless, since China has been consistently either flouting international nuclear export norms or encouraging rogue states to pursue clandestine nuclear weapon programmes under its protective umbrella, one should not be unduly surprised if China was to go ahead with the export.
Since apparently China had assured NSG members at the time of its admission that it did not have any ongoing commitment to Pakistan other than the supply of Chashma II to Pakistan, Hibbs reports that China would not claim that the new reactors are part of any earlier contract. According to him, it would rather argue that there are compelling political reasons for doing so in view of the stability of the region — echoing Pakistan’s oft-repeated complaint that the Indo-US nuclear deal has upset stability in the region by assisting India’s strategic programme. In short, China would justify its own illegal actions by shifting the blame onto India!!!
The issue is not what China would do. It is how the NSG members should or would act when China goes ahead with its nuclear exports to Pakistan. Not unnaturally, NSG members would wait for the US reaction to the exports. According to Hibbs, the Obama administration would acquiesce in the exports rather than condemn it or take any strong action, because of political expediency — to placate Pakistan and to gain China’s support for a US-initiated sanctions move against Iran in the UN Security Council. It is, of course, altogether another matter that the US will be the loser in such a bargain, since neither is Pakistan going to mend its errant ways in support of various violent non-state actors in the region, nor is it likely that any sanctions move in the UN that has China’s support will in any manner discourage Iran's nuclear weapons programme. But that too is another matter.
What is of interest to India is that the inaction and indifference of NSG members in censuring China will undoubtedly weaken, if not cripple, NSG's influence and hence India need not be apprehensive about any future NSG action in revoking the NSG exemption given to India in case India were to conduct a nuclear test in future. Just to be on the safe side, India should go easy on the matter of importing US reactors. Finally, and that is another story altogether, the Chinese move along with the weakening of NSG Guidelines will be a blow against any substantive move towards global nuclear disarmament.
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