Sunday, April 25, 2010

A better way to understand TRS by Bas Deelder, Marc H. Goedhart, and Ankur Agrawal

While teaching there are a lot of things we share with our students within and outside the class room as our learning is a continuing process. If we are able to do it satisfactorily then, as I always say, "learning is fun, teaching is fun." Otherwise it becomes painful and makes us draw wrong conclusions about each other. Here I would like to share with my readers some of the things I have already shared with my M.B.A. students while teaching finance and related subjects over the years.

Traditional methods of analyzing total returns to shareholders are flawed. There’s a better way.

Executives, board members, the press, and investors regularly look at total returns to shareholders (TRS) as an important metric of value creation. Yet TRS, like any performance metric, is instructive only when users understand its components. Actual corporate performance, for example, is only part of the mix, as TRS is also heavily influenced by changes in investors’ expectations of future performance. Sophisticated managers know that a failure to grasp how the various components work together can generate unrealistic expectations among companies or their investors and even steer companies to pursue more growth or take on more risk—without any value creation.

Sadly, most traditional ways of understanding TRS are flawed. Many of them, for example, define TRS as the sum of the percentage change in earnings plus the percentage change in market expectations—as measured by the price-earnings ratio (P/E)—plus the dividend yield. This simplistically connects TRS with changes in earnings, as if all forms of earnings growth created value equally. Not so. Earnings growth creates more value when it is rooted in activities that generate high returns on capital—such as the discovery of new customer segments for a company’s products—than in activities with low returns on capital, such as many acquisitions when the goodwill paid is taken into account.

Traditional approaches also err when they relate TRS to dividend payments. Dividends do not create value. For example, if a company pays a higher dividend today by taking on more debt, that simply means that future dividends must be lower. If a company pays a higher dividend by forgoing attractive investment opportunities, that also reduces future dividends. Finally, the usual approaches fail to account for the impact of financial leverage: two companies that created underlying value equally well could generate very different TRS, simply because of the difference in debt-equity ratio and the resulting differences in risk.

A better approach to understanding TRS breaks up the metric into four fundamental parts: a company’s operating performance, its stock market valuation at the beginning of the measurement period, changes in stock market expectations about its performance, and its financial leverage. The analysis can further divide a company’s operating performance into the value from revenue growth net of the capital required to grow, from margin improvements, and from improved capital productivity.

Consider a hypothetical example using a traditional approach to gauging TRS (Exhibit 1). Company A has a 14.4 percent TRS based on 7 percent earnings growth, a 3 percent change in the company’s P/E (as a proxy for changed expectations), and a 4.4 percent dividend yield. When we apply a more fundamental breakdown of the elements of TRS into the parts described above, however, we see that the reinvestment required to achieve the 7 percent earnings growth consumed most of the earnings growth; the TRS stemming from it is actually only 1.4 percent.1 With 3 percent coming from a change in expectations, the remaining 10 percent is the TRS that results from the company’s value at the start of the period—its “zero growth” return, which represents the company’s TRS if it had no earnings growth and investors had no change in expectations.2

Let’s now consider Company B, which is identical to Company A except for its debt financing (Exhibit 2). As a result, Company B generated higher TRS but did not create more value after adjusting for higher financial risk. The traditional decomposition approach fails to reflect this and suggests that Company B’s shareholders benefited from a higher dividend yield and a stronger increase in expectations. The fundamental decomposition clearly shows that at the business level, companies A and B have an identical TRS from zero-growth returns, growth, and changed expectations, when measured by the unlevered P/E multiple (enterprise value/earnings). The additional 3.6 percent TRS for Company B now shows up under TRS from capital structure, indicating that it is leverage-induced and not value creating.

Examples from various industries show how a more detailed, fundamental analysis can be illuminating. Let’s compare the TRS performance of the Dutch brewer Heineken and its Belgian–Brazilian competitor InBev. A traditional TRS decomposition suggests that InBev generated significantly higher annual shareholder returns over five years mainly because of its superior earnings growth (Exhibit 3). A deeper look with the new approach reveals more accurately where InBev made the difference.

Compared to Heineken, Interbrew (now InBev) was facing a bigger challenge in 2002 to generate strong TRS. Its valuation multiple already reflected higher investor expectations for future value creation, resulting in a zero-growth return three percentage points below that of Heineken.3

Over the subsequent five years, revenue growth was not an important factor for shareholder returns: InBev’s top-line annual growth of almost 24 percent did not create positive shareholder returns once capital expenditures and good-will paid were taken into consideration. Heineken actually generated higher shareholder returns from much lower revenue growth.4

InBev’s out performance of Heineken in terms of TRS was driven by its superior improvements in return on capital over the period. It generated an impressive 34.6 percent shareholder return per annum by pushing its return on invested capital5 (ROIC) from 14 percent in 2002 to an industry-leading 47 percent in 2007. Heineken, by contrast, saw its ROIC decline over the same period to 17 percent, from 24 percent, thereby losing around 5 percent in TRS.6

Finally, InBev’s TRS was negatively impacted by 14.4 percent as its valuation multiple declined from 2002 to 2007, reflecting lower stock market expectations that InBev would further improve its value creation. By contrast, the market increased its expectations for Heineken to improve its performance and growth after 2007, driving up TRS by 5.3 percent.

The analysis shows that InBev generated its shareholder returns through very strong operating improvements, not top-line growth. In contrast, most of Heineken’s TRS was due to a high zero-growth return and increased investor expectations. The company’s business growth and operating performance had little impact.

A more detailed decomposition of TRS can also offer insights into the drivers of shareholder returns in a sector as a whole. Take, for example, the stock market performance of the largest 25 European banks by market capitalization from 2002 to 2007 (Exhibit 4). These institutions are a good proxy for the entire European banking sector, as they represent around 80 percent of its assets. In aggregate, they have delivered a 15 percent TRS per annum over the last five years. A traditional TRS decomposition indicates that these returns largely reflect growth, suggesting that it is critical and that banks should focus on growth strategies.

This article was published in McKinsey Quarterly in July, 2008.

About the Authors:

Bas Deelder and Marc Goedhart were consultants then in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office; Ankur Agrawal was a consultant in the New York office.

Notes:
Required investments = 5.6 percent total returns to shareholders (TRS), ie, (107–100)/125.
More precisely, the “zero growth” return equals the earnings yield—that is, the inverse of the earnings multiple.
We call this the treadmill effect; see Richard F. C. Dobbs and Timothy M. Koller, “The expectations treadmill,” mckinseyquarterly.com, August 1998.
Keeping all other factors constant, such as returns on capital, investor expectations, and capital structure.
Return on invested capital (ROIC) adjusted for operating leases and excluding goodwill.
Again, keeping all other factors constant.

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