Tuesday, May 31, 2022

The Dark Side of the Indian Capital Market - Inspired by Sucheta Dalal

After reading Sucheta Dalal's article I feel like having viewed a good crime thriller in a lavish multiplex. It's a fact and not a story where the guilty always escape undetected and every time his employer (read - brokerage firm) goes all the way to protect him. And what does the regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) do? Nothing.

Since 2016, SEBI has issued multiple circulars to strengthen compliance and reporting requirements for brokers. In 2018, rules were framed to prevent unauthorised trading by stockbrokers and set up an early warning system. Yet, we have 32 broker failures over 2.5 years at the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and an unending list of unreported stories. Two have been discussed by the author.


Brokers have used the lock-down period to loot people with well-laid traps backed by the semblance of all regulatory compliances. They ensured technical compliance with all SEBI regulations pertaining to margin and ledger statements, emails and SMS messages.


A brokerage firm is not even a bank; yet, it has the audacity to wrest the extraordinary power to illegally freeze the demat accounts of family members and lock up their lifetime investments. All because the grievance redressal in India is poor and as good as non-existent and our courts and regulators have failed to ever award punitive damages to victims.


In another case the broker after violating SEBI’s guidelines began a criminal cover-up to avoid the loss of nearly Rs 7 cr that the firm would need to write off. The firm was mopping up huge brokerage income from these trades. More importantly, SEBI has no concept of a family account; the broker’s action was illegal and as good as highway robbery. The broker had no consent to even use the son’s shares as collateral for the loan to their mother or liquidate them to recoup losses.


To cut a long story short, the brokerage firm, instead of sacking the guilty employee, defended his action. In all, the broker got the 82-year-old mother to execute over 2,000 derivatives trades worth a mind-boggling Rs 340 cr between April 2020 and March 2021, leading to a loss of Rs 2 cr. The story shows that the employee’s actions were fully backed by the organisation which defended fraud, forgery and theft.


What happens next? The broker can continue to fight and seek arbitration. Since the amount is large, it will be examined by NSE and escalated to SEBI. On paper, the regulator has the power to search, seize, interrogate, raid and punish the broker. Will it act? So far, in the past 20 years, no SEBI chairman has woken up on behalf of investors.


To be continued

Monday, May 23, 2022

The Axis Mutual Fund Story

 

#suprioghatak #frontrunning #insidertrading #axismutualfund #sebi

The Axis Mutual Fund Story 

What is the difference between front-running and insider trading?

Both affect mutual fund unit holders and stock market investors.

Our seventh-largest fund house, Axis Mutual Fund, has suspended two fund managers including its chief dealer and is investigating improprieties in the funds they have handled. While it is yet unknown what is the exact nature of these violations, domestic mutual funds have come under investigation for front-running.

Front-running is not insider trading, though the culprits make money in both by trading in shares. In front-running, a dealer within an institutional money manager like a mutual fund or a share broker abuses knowledge of orders that the mutual fund has for the day and tries to profit from them.

What are the differences between the two?

How to make a cheat sheet in a front-running fraud

The fund manager decides what to buy or sell. Informs his dealer who executes the trade on behalf of the fund house. It has a dealing room in an isolated area where these trades happen all day long. Only dealers and fund managers are allowed entry. And the crime takes place here.

The dealer to make profit enters the market minutes before punching the fund house order. Mutual funds place large orders which sharply move the stock price.

The dealer buys or sells the stock minutes before a mutual fund places its trades, buying or selling the stock.

The idea is to profit from the big investor’s moves, either by buying or selling shares.

What is insider trading?

It is when a company insider, official, employee or senior executive, takes advantage of unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI) to trade in the company’s stock and make profits from such transactions.

It is done by a company’s employee to make profit by dealing in the company’s shares.

Front running can be done in just about any stocks or sectors by unrelated people, having knowledge of large investors’ plans to trade in the markets.

What is the Impact on investors?

Insider trading gives an unfair advantage on the basis of non-public information.

SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations clearly define the insider and what constitutes unpublished price-sensitive information.

Public shareholders like mutual funds are at a disadvantage as company insiders have access to UPSI, take undue advantage and use accounts of their associates to execute such trades.

SEBI has put in place certain checks and balances to prevent insider trading. For example, SEBI’s code of conduct for listed companies states that trading restrictions on insiders can come into force from the end of every quarter till 48 hours after the declaration of the company’s financial results.

In front-running, if the dealer benefits, how does it harm the unit holders of the fund house?

Knowing that the mutual fund is going to buy a certain stock, he can build a position immediately in another account. And as the price rises with the mutual fund buying it in large quantities, he can sell the stock and make a quick profit.

Similar is the case when the dealer knows that the mutual fund is going to sell a stock. Then, the mutual fund scheme is deprived of a market-driven price, as the presence of more participants who have taken positions in the market, the stock price gets impacted.

When the fund house finally enters, the stock price is already manipulated.

A one-off incident does not materially impact a stock’s price. But a dealer repeatedly front-running a large investor can make lots of money.

Worse still, if the buying is large enough, it can create a large jump in the stock price. So, when the mutual fund is buying, it is buying at a higher price than it would have otherwise.

The dealer will not execute such fraudulent trades in his own account, but through his associates and their accounts, to avoid getting caught. These accounts are mule accounts in stock market vocab.

Front-running also impacts other stock market investors, as the latter trade at prices manipulated by the dealer for his own gain.

Most mutual funds have strong control measures to check front-running. Access to dealing room is strictly controlled. Surveillance cameras keep an eye on the dealing room. No mobile phones are allowed inside the dealing room.

All conversations are on recorded lines. Declarations need to be made of personal holdings as well as those defined as relatives. Pre-clearance is required when trading in shares in personal account or in those of relatives.

However, all such controls are possible within the premises of the fund house. Work from home has made it difficult to ensure these controls in letter and spirit. Calls still get recorded, but who is interacting within his own premises cannot be controlled.

How has SEBI dealt with front running?

When SEBI has found violations, it has imposed monetary penalties. Dealers, fund managers and the outside brokers with whom they have worked in collusion get penalised. Rarely the CEO of the fund house pays a monetary penalty. Unlike US SEC, it is rarer in India to penalise or debar a CEO of an Asset Management Company. On the gravity of the securities fraud, SEBI pulls up the fund house’s trustees and the Board of Directors.

Sometimes, proceedings get settled through consent mechanism of SEBI, also known as settlement process, where the institution under investigation, settles the case with SEBI in lieu of payment of monetary penalty and voluntary restrictions. In one of the first cases of insider trading that came to light in public domain, a large fund house’s head had to pay Rs 15 lakh fine, as part of SEBI’s consent proceedings. The fund house and its trustee board had to pay Rs 20 lakh each.

A consent mechanism is usually of two types; one where the fund house neither admits nor denies the findings of fact or conclusion of law, and the second category where there is admission. In the first the penalty amount is higher in comparison to the cases where fund house admits the charges.

And how is the consent fine decided? SEBI relies on the formula prescribed in the Regulations where it takes into account the size and nature of the offence, impact on the market, the company and conduct of the culprit.

To be continued

Friday, May 20, 2022

The Fall of The House of Cards. How Founders Burnt Millions and Razed Zilingo to the Ground

The Fall of The House of Cards. How Founders Burnt Millions and Razed Zilingo to the Ground

#suprioghatak #zilingo #startups #sequoia

Introduction

Zilingo, a play on the word "zillion," was established in 2015 by CEO Ankiti Bose and cofounder Dhruv Kapoor. The idea came when Bose, holidaying in Bangkok, noticed many small and medium-sized shops without online presence.

In 2015 Bose left Sequoia Capital where she was an investment analyst and launched her own company, Zilingo. At twenty-three she founded Zilingo, an e-commerce platform that offers B2B focused services. She moved to Singapore in 2016, where she developed Zilingo software and supply chain solutions.

From building solar panels and games to an e-commerce unicorn, that’s the journey of Zilingo’s Dhruv Kapoor. An IIT-Guwahati alumni, now heading a 100-odd team, he structures work for engineering, UX design, product management, data analytics, data science, and multiple other teams regularly. He worked at Yahoo for a couple of years till 2013. As co-founder and Chief Technology and Product Officer at Zilingo, Dhruv is excited by the possibility of shaping the future of supply chains.

Zilingo has developed a proprietary suite of applications which allows fashion merchants to access manufacturers around Asia.

Businesses include a business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) marketplace, private label as a service, an e-pos and inventory management service, trend forecasting and fintech services.

Why a VC like Sequoia bought in

Sequoia Capital is an American venture capital (VC) firm owned by Doug Leone and Michael Moritz headquartered in Menlo Park, California which mainly focuses on the technology industry. It was the most active VC fund company in India in 2019. 

Zilingo said it has raised $226 M in its latest funding round from existing backers such as VC Sequoia Capital, with Singapore’s Temasek Holdings joining as a new investor in 2019.

Sequoia Capital is among the top VC firms globally, investing in startups at the growth stage and above. In 2018, they launched Surge for early-stage startups based on–or building for–India and Southeast Asia. It has funded 11 SEA startups in 2019, making it the 4th most active VC in Southeast Asia.

What’s Happening Now

A bitter clash of vision between founders Ankiti Bose and Dhruv Kapoor is threatening to swallow Zilingo.

The capital-intensive B2C vertical and lack of a tech platform for B2B operations initially led to overspending on marketing, employees emptying cash and much more.

Ankiti Bose is suspended and has initiated legal action and exploring a lawsuit against Dhruv Kapoor and likes to buy back Sequoia’s 26% stake in Zilingo.

How did the circumstances turn so threatening for Zilingo?

Ankiti Bose and Zilingo’s life has taken a turn since inception. It searched for growth in 2018.

The idea that came out would change the trajectory of Zilingo forever. It solved the challenge with scaling up and signing vendors and suppliers very fast.

But involved operations and deep discounting that would straighten out the startup, one of the biggest success stories from Southeast Asia and Singapore.

In 2021, another massive shift — more significant than planned. It was a clash between Bose and Sequoia, the company’s earliest and most consistent institutional investor.

It was not professional fallout, but something personal between the two over the direction of the company, the cash burn and no road to profitability, all dating back to the focus on rampant growth from 2018. This happened even as tensions between Bose and Dhruv Kapoor continued to escalate.

Kapoor and other senior employees at the company buried complaints of sexual harassment.

How did things get so bad?

A house of cards, riddled with ideas missing in the initial years, and overspending to market and promote the B2C fashion vertical meant Zilingo burnt millions. The founders clashed over ideas and alleged patterns of sexual harassment in the company.

Was there Willful Fraud

There was willful fraud. We don’t know what it was, how it happened and how it evaded notice of the board and investors.

This escalated from mismanagement, millions of dollars burnt to a massive controversy threatening to swallow the entire company. What will happen to the 500+ employees? Why the VCs are neglecting corporate governance processes and not pushing for transparency are all million-dollar questions. 

The operations initially were in a complete mess owing to a lack of a working tech platform to onboard clients. Processes and sales reporting were manually done like traditional supply chain businesses. Sales and procurement teams worked without any direction or targets.

Valuation Built On GMV

The only focus to maximize GMV led to a no-holds-barred approach to sales and unethical behaviour from the sales team.

Sales personnel striking cash-based deals with vendors, overbilling purchases and under-invoicing sales. And the buyer and seller were the same or related entities.

Emails sent from fake email IDs to Zilingo’s auditors in Singapore containing documents confirming outstanding amounts owed by some vendors.

It is still unclear if the dues were recovered or they were actually outstanding.

Zilingo has not filed its financials in Singapore since FY2019.

Its latest audited financial performance shows losses of $236.5 M in FY2019. Net cash flow from operating activities was a negative $95 M, with a high debt-to-equity ratio of -1.60.

Zilingo has completely shut its B2C operations — it only contributed 0.5% to the net revenue in FY2021, and is not accounted for in FY2022 projections.

Over the past three financial years (2019-2021), the cumulative loss for the company was over $430 M, while the total net income over these years is just $285 M. However, the company is claiming positive contribution margins in FY2021 of $4.1 M.

Zilingo Mismanaged Millions

Its expansion did not stop with zero planning. It issued $14 M in loans from books to suppliers in India and Indonesia. No risk assessment was conducted and the entire amount written off as bad.

Zilingo paid more than 2X just seven months later after Bose showed desperation to acquire nCinga.

Bose expensed personal spending to the company’s accounts.

The current scenario and suspension of Ankiti Bose is not about cash burn or GMV boosting, which Zilingo did, but willful misconduct and fraud, the nature and the perpetrator of which are still a mystery.

Ankiti Bose Vs Dhruv Kapoor

Kapoor had been at odds with Bose on a number of matters.

He was disappointed with the nCinga acquisition. Promises made by Bose were not kept. And then there was more tension to follow in 2020.

After laying off employees in 2020, Zilingo entered the personal protective equipment (PPEs) space. Kapoor opposed this as it was not Zilingo’s strength. Despite Bose’s assurances it signed contracts with German and Indian governments and brought on suppliers.

The Indian government is in a legal battle for failure to deliver 10 M KN95 masks. The contract value was $22.5 M. Zilingo claims the Indian government did not give the mandatory 30% of total invoice value as bank guarantee. This is pending in the Delhi High Court.

Despite being cofounders and having substantial stake, Kapoor and Bose seemed to lead different companies. Kapoor was into tech and product development, while Bose led the sales, marketing and administrative responsibilities. Such a split is common, but what is not is one not knowing what the other’s doing. This is a serious lapse in judgement and leadership apathy for critical areas of the business. Kapoor is equally responsible for upholding best practices, and calling out problems or issues. But alas these were two different Zilingos, culturally and organisationally. And this is what completely derailed Zilingo after years of burning cash became a problem.

Sequoia’s Shailendra Singh Vs Ankiti Bose 

There was a change in dynamics between Bose, key investor Sequoia Capital India and Shailendra Singh, a managing director at the VC firm. The fallout began in January 2021.

These two objectives — profitability and fundraising — seemed diametrically opposite and the CEO was uncertain on whether this slow-burn strategy would pay off.

Bose believed Zilingo had enough to push for growth and raise a new round, but this line of thinking was clashing with Sequoia’s goals.

At one point, Sequoia had suggested former Myntra CEO Ananth Narayanan, as a successor. But constant decline from Ankiti’s side as she thought Sequoia has never pushed other founders from its portfolio in this way.

Who Watches The Celebrity Founder? 

Investors asking for profitability is nothing new, but the duo’s relationship is said to have deteriorated when Bose accused Sequoia of selectively targetting her.

In the aftermath of CEO Bose’s suspension and the stepping down of Sequoia’s Shailendra Singh from Zilingo’s board, the VC firm released a post on its blog talking about corporate governance, willful fraud and misconduct by its founders. The suspension comes after a whistleblower allegation against fraud in Zilingo.

Can investors claim ignorance for all practices at Zilingo? How has the board, which includes Sequoia, other prominent investors, not looked into the books or financials for two years, having had a full-time CFO?

And if they were examined, how did wilful fraud escape notice?

What Next for Zilingo?

A parallel lie in BharatPe and Zilingo — one of the cofounders has been suspended for irregularities, while the focus is on mudslinging and digging up old accusations.

Sexual harassment complaints were raised against a senior employee, who is there since 2019 and now heading the company’s primary revenue source. These were buried by the management.

From 900 employees in early 2020, workforce has reduced to 500 after many rounds of layoffs.

Even if it raises funds at a less than satisfactory valuation, the pressure to grow and show profits will remain. The other option is distress sale at a lower valuation, impacting employees, as transformation of people post acquisitions is a big challenge. Zilingo will be having a new CEO in the near future.

Ankiti Bose is a huge part of the company — a brand in her own right and the face of Zilingo — but her days might be numbered, unless her legal steps yield results. But with a new leader or with Bose as CEO, will it matter? Can Zilingo and its founders climb out of the hole they have dug?

What will happen in the near future?

Ankiti Bose is exploring buyback option ahead of board meeting and has begun talks with new investors to buy out a majority stake, including the 25% equity owned by Sequoia Capital.

Zilingo is one of Sequoia Capital India’s key investments in the South East Asia region, and the start-up entered the unicorn club when it raised a $226 M Series D round in April 2019. Bose who is at the helm of the company since its inception in 2015 is facing allegations of financial irregularities, with the board accusing her of inflating revenues.

The allegations against Bose emerged after the start-up began the internal process to raise $200 M in funding led by Goldman Sachs Group which has now been discontinued. Zilingo submitted all key financial statements for a due diligence process for the $200 M funding. The company currently has enough cash in the bank for the next 15-18 months. The $200 M talks for funding were paused without her consent, accounting practices and financial investigation was launched on March 31 and she was immediately suspended from her role as CEO. The investigation was prompted by Zilingo’s auditor raising questions about its accounting during the due diligence process

Zilingo has appointed Deloitte to probe the harassment charges filed by cofounder Ankiti Bose against the company after her suspension as confirmed by the board on 2nd May. The decision to suspend her was a joint decision by the board and the relevant shareholders.

After the suspension, Sequoia India MD Shailendra Singh vacated his seat on Zilingo's board, in an ongoing exodus that has seen representatives from Temasek and Burda Principal quit.

The startup has raised more than $308 M to date, with Germany’s Burda and Sofina Capital being its other major investors. The entire situation at Zilingo unfolded while it was in talks for raising a funding round worth $150-200 M.

To be continued

(Inspired by Nikhil Subramaniam)

Wednesday, May 18, 2022

How Reliance got the Keys. What Mukesh Ambani did at Future Retail can be a B-School Case Study

How Reliance got the Keys. What Mukesh Ambani did at Future Retail can be a B-School Case Study

#suprioghatak #amazon #relianceretail #futureretail

Amazon’s claim to ownership rests primarily on paper. Reliance has legal arguments of its own too, based on another set of contracts. But with one key difference—Reliance also owns the keys to the building.

In terms of legal brilliance it would be hard to top what Amazon had done. But that was before we understood what Reliance did. Because that is just something else altogether. And it makes for an even better story. Let's find out what happened on the night of February 25.

The fight over Future Retail’s assets had a surprise finale — when a billionaire just took over the shopping aisles.

In the unexpected climax, Mukesh Ambani decided who gets to own the assets of Future Retail Ltd. not in an arbitration tribunal in Singapore or in a courtroom in New Delhi, but in a shopping aisle.

Future Retail had been subleasing store space from Reliance Industries Ltd. It was operating only on Ambani’s endurance as Future couldn’t come up with the rent. But with Amazon continuing to block Reliance’s $3.4 B purchase of Future’s assets, Ambani decided to make the acquisition a fact of life. He terminated the leases and is taking control of the properties.

It was a dramatic epilogue to a three year old narrative. Amazon initially helped Future by investing $192 M in Future Coupons Private Limited, a gift voucher unit of founder Kishore Biyani for him to use the funds to steady the debt-laden Indian retailer.

The 2019 deal's condition was that assets in the 1,500 stores pan India wouldn’t be sold to Ambani, who owns India’s largest retail empire. Biyani did exactly that after Covid-19 decimated operations. Amazon began proceedings against Future for breach of contract. The Reliance deal was on hold until Ambani decided he has had enough. 

Future Retail was living under a rock. Its bailout by Ambani was a commercial deal and not a humanitarian mission. It was Future’s job to take care of all its stakeholders, most importantly the creditors.

And where’s Amazon in all this? It has learned the hard way that taking on Ambani on his home turf was impossible. So Amazon offered an out-of-court settlement over its funds invested in Future Coupons Pvt. Ltd. which had been its first move in the drama. Amazon couldn’t have rescued Future Retail as India’s draconian foreign direct investment (FDI) rules were a big roadblock. So it did the next best thing. It funded privately held Future Coupons indirectly holding some control over Future Retail.

That control proved to be fragile. After agreeing to Reliance’s deal, Future wanted to come out of the contract with Amazon. Its independent directors complained to Competition Commission of India (CCI) that Amazon had deliberately misled the true nature of the Future Coupons deal, which effectively put Amazon in the driver’s seat at Future Retail, violating India’s 2018 FDI law. CCI promptly suspended its earlier approval of Amazon’s investment, and the Delhi High Court halted the Singapore arbitration panel’s work.

But if Future with a net worth of negative $280 M was betting that Reliance would wait patiently as it sorted out its legal troubles with Amazon, it misjudged the situation. 342 of its large stores and 493 of smaller outlets — constituting 55% to 65% of retail revenue — have so far received termination notices of sub-leases from Reliance entities.

It’s dishonest for Future to now appear shocked, that Amazon is moving in before concluding the formal purchase. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Amazon had given Future an option in January for a further $914 M bailout, but Future's independent directors found it inadequate, given the astronomical debt. Now it’s for Future’s 2025 dollar bondholders to figure out if they’ll be made whole. Trading around 60 cents to the dollar through the stealth acquisition, it doesn't indicate any creditor confidence.

How does a physical takeover work? There’s inventory, furniture, lighting and point-of-sale equipment, all pledged to creditors.

There’s nothing left at Reliance to discuss. The outcome is this. On the urging of Future Retail, the Indian judiciary put a bullet through the arbitration law, never allowing it to settle a simple commercial dispute. The consequences are for Future — and India — to bear.

When faced with heavyweight opponents, the odds of enforcing a contract in the country are slim. Nobody should complain if foreigners are skeptical of India’s growth in “ease of doing business." But then, it’s a fast-modernizing market of 1.4 B consumers. Amazon can’t give up on it. It alleged that Future was trying to remove the “substratum of the dispute" by transferring its stores to Reliance in a “clandestine manner." It informed the Supreme Court that truce talks had failed. It’s hard to say if Amazon’s continued protests will discourage Future's lenders from blessing the change of control — or if it’s already too late for that.

As for Future, it doesn’t have much. Going defunct is a feature of capitalism. But the humiliating manner in which an Indian pioneer of modern retail got ripped apart store by store for the wrong choices it made should be a case study.

However, before academics get busy, creditors need to find out where the shopping racks and the cash machines are kept. It’s their collateral, after all, and the comprehensive lesson of this contest has been that everyone should grab what they can. While stocks last.

Updates as of Now

State Bank of India has written to Future Retail Ltd. seeking accountability on the company's stores taken over by Mukesh Ambani-controlled Reliance Industries Ltd. SBI reiterated that the lenders have rights over stock, moveable fixed assets in all the outlets of the company, and in the case of its sale, the entire proceeds will need to be used to settle their dues.

Reliance Projects & Property Management Services Ltd. had taken over 835 sub-leased stores of Future Retail after voiding the lease agreements, the company had informed exchanges in March. These included 342 large-format stores including Big Bazaar, Fashion@Big Bazaar, and 493 small outlets such as Easy Day and Heritage. Reliance Group also took over 112 Future Lifestyle Fashions Ltd. stores.

After Reliance took over the stores, Bank of India on behalf of the lenders had issued a public notice warning people against dealing with Future Group's assets. In the notice, the bank had highlighted that lenders have rights over the group's assets owing to the loans they had extended, and any sale without their consent would be subject to legal proceedings.

The lenders are not sure if the value determined nearly two years ago would still hold since significant deterioration has taken place since. Even if the sale were to be concluded now, lenders are unlikely to recover a large part of their Rs 30,000 cr dues against Future.

(Inspired by Andy Mukherjee) 

 

To be continued